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Hub Story: Australia’s AUKUS Debate
(Only doing one story this week on account of the 4th of July)
Hub Story: Australia’s AUKUS Debate
AUKUS is a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States aimed at enhancing military capabilities. AUKUS is structured around two pillars meant to advance Australia’s undersea capability and technological integration. Recently, some have cast doubt about the wisdom of pursuing this initiative.
Pillar One focuses on delivering and building nuclear-powered submarines for Australia. Pillar Two emphasizes the collaboration between the three nations in advanced defense and security technologies, including cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea capabilities. Regarding Pillar One, the three countries have released the following Optimal Pathway:
Australian Submarine Agency: Optimal Pathway:
The Optimal Pathway will:
Deliver Australia a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability as soon as the early 2030s.
Elevate all 3 nations' industrial capacity to produce and sustain advanced and interoperable nuclear-powered submarines for decades to come.
Expand our individual and collective undersea presence in the Indo-Pacific and contribute to global security and stability in the region.
This year, there has been growing debate among Australian strategic thinkers about the utility and wisdom of pursuing AUKUS. Recently, the debate has revolved around an article in the Australian Foreign Affairs by Australian defense analyst Hugh White. Unfortunately, the article is pay-walled, but White summarized his arguments during an interview with The Australia Institute.
As I understand it, White’s assessment is categorized into four buckets:
Australia already faces the daunting task of maintaining its current fleet of submarines:
Australia currently has six Collins-class submarines, which have been in operation since the 1990s.
These six boats will undergo extensive life-of-type extensions (LOTE) that will cost AU$4 billion to AU$5 billion, making them already a big and expensive undertaking.
Because LOTE upgrades require submarines to be out of service, submariners will have fewer opportunities to train, hurting the workforce pipeline.
There are too many risks around the transfer of US Virginia-class submarines to Australia:
White casts doubt that Australian submariners will be able to develop the necessary and complex skills needed to operate nuclear-powered submarines in time for the first transfer in the early 2030s.
Additionally, even if the workforce is adequately trained, Washington might decide not to transfer the Virginia-class submarines.
The United States faces major issues in its own submarine industrial base, preventing it from fully resourcing its security priorities. A new Trump Administration might decide to pull the promise of Virginia-class submarines in order to not diminish its own capability.
The British submarine industrial base cannot support their AUKUS commitments:
The United Kingdom will start building the first AUKUS-class nuclear-powered submarines and aim to deliver them in the late 2030s; Australia will build the next round of AUKUS-class subs and aim for a service date in the early 2040s.
The UK is struggling to service its current fleet. One of its four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines has been in dock refueling for seven years. Its current class of attack submarines has been delivered late and over budget, and the UK lacks the industrial base to repair and service them.
Given these issues, many are concerned that the United Kingdom will not be able to provide the new AUKUS-class by the late 2030s.
The Australian submarine industrial base cannot support the AUKUS initiatives:
Australia will need a 20,000-person direct workforce to build and sustain Australia’s submarine ambitions.
Australia will have to start from scratch on building a new workforce to support AUKUS, which can come with advantages and challenges.
Concerns about skill shortages remain a real concern for Australia’s ability to build and service its portion on time and within budget.
The final concern critics generally have about AUKUS—beyond the initiative’s feasibility—is whether it is strategically sound for Australia to fully align with the United States. Defense planners in Washington question if AUKUS is wise because the United States can’t be sure that Australia will join in a conflict with China. White and other critics seem to believe that Washington will pressure Canberra into joining a conflict with China if Australia agrees to accept Virginia-class submarines.
Hugh White’s essay on AUKUS has garnered considerable pushback from Australia’s defense community.
National security expert Jennifer Parker has rebutted an article series in the Australian Financial Review that made many of the same arguments about AUKUS’s optimal pathway. Parker argues that the UK submarine industrial base is executing its priorities on time.
Australian Financial Review: There is No Catastrophic Failure of AUKUS Plan A:
AUKUS is a critical project for the UK, and Australia needs the UK’s support for it to succeed. Curran is right to highlight the stresses on the UK submarine industrial base, and UK officials have consistently highlighted that the production of its replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is its priority, followed by AUKUS…
The UK’s ageing Vanguard submarines (SSBNs) are being replaced by four Dreadnought class vessels (SSBNs). The construction of three of the four is under way, and the first is expected to be operational in the early 2030s. Despite Curran’s assertion that the delivery timeframe has not been updated in six years and might have slipped, the 2022-2023 UK Ministry of Defence annual report lists the Dreadnought program as on track for delivery in the early 2030s.
More importantly, although the “optimal pathway” is complex and hence unlikely to run exactly to plan, there is no evidence to date of a catastrophic failing of the pathway, nor the development of a level of extreme risk that cannot be managed.
Justin Bassi, the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, takes aim at Hugh White’s larger argument that AUKUS is not only a technical catastrophe but also a strategic mistake.
The Strategist: The AUKUS Goal: Balancing Power in the Region:
White portrays [AUKUS’s] goal as an effort simply to preserve US dominance, even at the cost of a catastrophic war with China in which Australia would become entangled. Australia, he argues, is backing the wrong horse and should place its bets elsewhere.
But he is misrepresenting the end state that AUKUS supporters seek: not war for the United States but deterrence for an evolving and diverse region. White refuses to recognise that, as a regional power, Australia has agency and must contribute to a balance of the region that necessarily includes the United States—whose continued engagement should be encouraged through clear signals that others are prepared to step up.
Justin Burke of Australia’s National Security College argues that while AUKUS has many hurdles, the three countries have demonstrated that they will take early actions to support AUKUS’s core goals.
Australian National University: Strategic Necessity: A Response to Hugh White on AUKUS:
White is on stronger ground describing the huge challenges AUKUS will face in coming years, from the likely costs to the fragility of the United Kingdom’s nuclear submarine enterprise and the uncertainties of the United States’ political system. But where he sees reasons to capitulate now – a recurring theme in his oeuvre – most on the frontlines are emboldened by the significant successes of the past two and a half years, from persuading the famously risk-averse US nuclear navy that we could be trusted, to the tortuous but ultimately successful passage of key enabling legislation through the US Congress last year.
Ultimately, AUKUS has a tough road ahead. Funding, industrial infrastructure, and workforce issues will all determine AUKUS’s success. The good news for the national security community is that the Australian public still broadly supports AUKUS. However, that support has slowly been dwindling. The Lowy Institute polling shows that Australian support for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines was at 70 percent in 2022 and has slightly dropped to 65 percent. If the three countries can execute the optimal pathway with reasonable efficiency, then I think those numbers will hold, but if serious mistakes happen, then Australians might question if this endeavor is worth the $300 billion price tag. The strategic calculations that led to AUKUS are correct. Canberra is right to coordinate with partners like the United States and the United Kingdom as Australia enters an increasingly dangerous era. It’s up to the three nations to take the initiative and execute it as best they can.
Worth Your Time:
Australia:
Japan:
The Diplomat: Japan’s Enhanced Security Engagement With the Pacific Islands
Defense News: First Batch of Marine Amphibious Combat Vehicles Arrive in Okinawa
The Japan Times: Japan’s Defense Ministry Unveils First Basic Policy on Use of AI
Breaking Defense: F-15EX, F-35 Headed to Japan Under New DoD Tactical Aircraft Laydown
The Philippines:
Nikkei Asia: Philippines-Japan Meeting to Eye Defense Pact, May Bud More 'Coalitions'
Reuters: Philippines Turned Down US Help Amid South China Sea Tensions - Military Chief
South Korea:
Other: