Hub Story: Washington Conducts Major Military Exercises
Spoke Story: Commerce Holds Supply Chain Meeting with Japan and ROK
Spoke Story: What Should Asian Allies Expect From Second Trump Admin?
Hub Story: Washington Conducts Major Military Exercises
The United States led two major international naval exercises this past week.
The inaugural trilateral multi-domain exercise, Freedom Edge, took place from June 27 to 29, 2024, involving Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States. Announced at the Camp David Summit in August 2023, it aimed to enhance trilateral interoperability and promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The exercise focused on ballistic missile defense, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, maritime interdiction, and defensive cyber training.
The exercises, which began south of South Korea’s Jeju Island, underscore the commitment of Japan, ROK, and the U.S. to address North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats and counter China’s increasing military activities. The three nations plan to continue and expand the Freedom Edge exercise in the future.
It’s always worth noting how far South Korea and Japan have come in the past couple of years. For South Korea and President Yoon, a stronger ROK-Japan relationship is critical to building credible deterrence against North Korea. While Japan is, of course, concerned about North Korean aggression, building stronger security ties with South Korea contributes to Japan’s larger strategy of being an Asian security leader and being more proactive in maintaining regional stability.
It wasn’t long ago that South Korea and Japan were at odds. One example was a very close military clash in 2018.
Nikkei Asia: Japan, South Korea Move Past Radar Row to Improve Defense Ties:
The radar incident occurred in December 2018, when the Japanese and South Korean governments were at odds over the issue of forced labor during World War II. Off the Noto Peninsula in the Sea of Japan, a Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft claimed a South Korean naval destroyer locked a fire-control radar on it…
The dispute quickly escalated. Japanese government accused the South Korean navy of carrying out a "dangerous act," and released footage from inside the patrol plane.
South Korea responded the following year by drawing up a guideline stipulating that if a SDF aircraft flew within a short distance without responding to two warnings, it would target it with a radar. The standoff remained for five years.
The South Korea-Japan rapprochement began in 2022, culminating in 2023 Camp David Summit. CNAS has a great report that tracks trilateral security cooperation since 2022.
One of the big questions that remains is to what extent ROK-Japan rapprochement is contingent on the initiative of South Korean President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida. Kishida’s approval ratings this week hit an all-time low of 25 percent. While Yoon isn’t as low as Kishida, he still suffers from poor polling. There’s the added question of what would happen to Biden Administration initiatives like the ROK-Japan-U.S. trilateral, AUKUS, and others if Donald Trump secures another term. However, that is discussed in more depth below.
In addition to Freedom Edge, the 29th biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, the world’s largest international maritime exercise, started this week in Honolulu, Hawaii. This year, approximately 29 nations, 40 surface ships, three submarines, 14 national land forces, over 150 aircraft, and more than 25,000 personnel will participate, and the exercise will end on August 1st.
RIMPAC is not just about military exercises. It's a platform for inclusivity and multinational cooperation. With a focus on building relationships, enhancing interoperability, and contributing to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, RIMPAC brings together nations from around the Pacific in a shared effort for global security. This year, the exercise will include its largest humanitarian aid and disaster relief exercise, further reinforcing the spirit of inclusivity and cooperation.
Finally, the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment concluded the Marine Aviation Support Activity 24 in Luzon, marking the end of their longest deployment to the Philippines since 2022. This exercise was part of a series, including Exercise Balikatan 24 and Archipelagic Coastal Defense Continuum, aimed at enhancing the Philippine Marine Corps’ Coastal Defense strategy. These joint exercises showcased the interoperability and coordination between U.S. and Philippine forces, reinforcing regional security and stability. Supported by treaties like the Mutual Defense Treaty, these exercises underscore the robust U.S.-Philippine military alliance, with plans for future collaborations already in motion. The U.S.-Philippines relationship grows by the day. I suspect there will be more to say on this soon.
Spoke Story: South Korea-Japan-U.S. Meet on Economic Security
The U.S., Japan, and South Korea have agreed to strengthen supply chains for critical goods, including high-tech chips, but did not agree to tighten trade curbs against China despite U.S. efforts. This decision was made during a trilateral meeting in Washington involving U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, Japanese Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Ken Saito, and South Korean Trade, Industry and Energy Minister Ahn Duk-geun.
The focus will be on supply chain reliability and sustainability rather than just low prices. The joint statement mentioned concerns over “non-market measures” that disrupt supplies of critical minerals but did not include stricter export restrictions against China, which the U.S. had pushed for. This disconnect reflects differing intentions: while Washington is concerned about China’s advanced semiconductor capabilities, Japan worries about potential Chinese retaliation, cutting off critical mineral supplies.
However, I’m skeptical to what extent this meeting was supposed to be about export controls. In fact, the trilateral has a different mechanism to work on export controls: the Disruptive Technology Protection Network (DTPN). The DTPN met earlier this year with only marginal progress on increasing export controls.
The United States, Japan and the ROK enjoy strong trade relationships and law enforcement cooperation. Recognizing that violations of export controls or other laws prohibiting the illicit transfer of technology threaten their respective national security interests, the delegations agreed that combating illicit technology transfer is a critical national and economic security imperative and agreed to further enhance cooperation and information sharing through the signing of two memoranda of intent between the three countries.
Over the course of the day, delegates shared updates on their respective technology protection efforts, presented case studies about recent enforcement actions, and provided overviews of their key enforcement authorities. The summit ended with a comprehensive discussion of practical next steps to execute the newly-signed memoranda and concurrence on the network’s near- and medium-term goals.
Japan has followed the United States with export controls of advanced semiconductor equipment going to China, but Washington should be cautious about pushing Japan too hard on this. Japan can’t sanction a country unless that nation is involved in an armed conflict, so Japan had to ban 160 countries from accessing this advanced equipment. Any additional export controls will probably have to follow this same formula, making the costs particularly high for Japan.
Apprehensions about export controls will continue to rise as Washington looks to expand export controls beyond just advanced semiconductors, including bans on equipment for lower-tech foundational chips. Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan Estevez recently visited Japan to push for broader export controls. Maybe they had hoped to make an announcement last week about expanded restrictions, but that did not happen. Instead, the real focus was on supply chain resiliency.
Our shared intent is to leverage this trilateral mechanism to promote the development of critical and emerging technologies and strengthen the security and resiliency of our economies. Recognizing these two goals are intertwined, we aim to prioritize cooperation to strengthen the resilience of supply chains in key sectors, including semiconductors and batteries…
The Joint Statement focused a lot on the Principles for Supply Chain Resilience, which is an international guiding statement on economic security.
White House: Principles for Supply Chain Resilience:
As partners in promoting secure and resilient supply chains, countries discussed working together and with the private sector to address critical supply chain challenges:
Improving information sharing and transparency: Countries expressed intent to expand efforts to sharing information about potential, emerging, and systemic supply chain
schallenges bilaterally and multilaterally, so that we can collectively work to address them—including mechanisms to improve early warning of disruption. We will endeavor to share best practices to address port congestion and current disruptions to supply chains. This work will be undertaken consistent with market principles.
Sustainable development: Countries expressed intent to expand cooperation, information sharing, and consider co-investment for the responsible access and development of key raw materials and inputs, and we will foster and support the sustainable manufacture and trade of products necessary for the fight against climate change and other international sustainability goals.
Security of supply: Countries expressed intent to consult with one another to address potential shortages and to cooperate to address shortages that could potentially impact our countries, while maintaining open markets.
However, unless Japan and South Korea can substantially find alternative avenues to critical minerals, Washington's push for stricter export controls will be limited. Both countries have made big strides in recent years. For example, in 2010, Japan imported about 90 percent of its rare earth minerals from China. Today, Japan imports about 60 percent from China. Despite the significant drop, the reliance is still high, and therefore, further cooperation will correspond with their reliance on China.
Spoke Story: What Should Asian Allies Expect From Trump 2.0?
After Joe Biden’s disastrous debate performance last week, a second Trump Administration is becoming increasingly likely. Speculation about what this means for U.S. alliance management is ramping up. CSIS’s Victor Cha wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs about this topic and argues that Asian allies should be more worried about Trump than they currently are.
Cha accurately describes what Trump would prioritize in a second term and that relationships with partners will become more tense, but some of the concerns go too far. My main point of disagreement is that Trump’s new foreign policy team will want to pull out of Asia.
Foreign Affairs: America’s Asian Partners Are Not Worried Enough About Trump:
A second Trump administration is likely to be far more disruptive for Asia than the first one was. In Trump’s first term, his most radical foreign policy instincts were blunted by the presence of seasoned appointees; these figures will not be present in a second term. If Trump gets a second chance at the presidency, he is even more likely than before to see allies as trade adversaries, reduce the U.S. military footprint worldwide, befriend autocratic leaders, and challenge the norms that have thus far secured nuclear nonproliferation in Asia.
Cha is certainly correct that a new Trump Admin will focus on trade balances and be more confrontational with allies instead of the more collaborative process that the Biden Administration has preferred. However, few of Trump’s foreign policy advisors support a reduced U.S. military footprint in Asia. In fact, it’s quite the opposite.
Former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien laid out what he thinks a second Trump Administration should prioritize, calling for more burden-sharing from allies but also an increased military presence.
Foreign Affairs: The Return of Peace Through Strength:
The United States should focus its Pacific diplomacy on allies such as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, traditional partners such as Singapore, and emerging ones such as Indonesia and Vietnam. Critics suggest that Trump’s calls for U.S. allies in Asia to contribute more to their own defense might worry them. On the contrary: my discussions with officials in the region have revealed that they would welcome more of Trump’s plain talk about the need for alliances to be two-way relationships and that they believe his approach would enhance security.
Joint military exercises with such countries are essential… Congress indicated in 2022 that the United States should invite Taiwan to join the exercises. But Biden has refused to do so—a mistake that must be remedied.
Taiwan spends around $19 billion annually on its defense, which amounts to just under three percent of its annual economic output. Although that is better than most U.S. allies and partners, it is still too little. Other countries in this increasingly dangerous region also need to spend more. And Taiwan’s shortcoming is not solely its own fault: past U.S. administrations have sent mixed signals about Washington’s willingness to supply Taiwan with arms and help defend it. The next administration should make clear that along with a continued U.S. commitment comes an expectation that Taiwan spend more on defense and take other steps, as well, such as expanding military conscription.
Meanwhile, Congress should help build up the armed forces of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam by extending to them the kinds of grants, loans, and weapons transfers that the United States has long offered Israel. The Philippines, in particular, needs rapid support in its standoff with Chinese forces in the South China Sea. The navy should undertake a crash program to refurbish decommissioned ships and then donate them to the Philippines, including frigates and amphibious assault ships sitting in reserve in Philadelphia and Hawaii.
The navy should also move one of its aircraft carriers from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the Pentagon should consider deploying the entire Marine Corps to the Pacific, relieving it in particular of missions in the Middle East and North Africa. U.S. bases in the Pacific often lack adequate missile defenses and fighter jet protection—a scandalous deficiency that the Defense Department should fix by quickly shifting resources from elsewhere.
It’s fair to argue that O’Brien doesn’t accurately represent the entirety of the Trump Team’s foreign policy outlook and that O’Brien would be one of the few remaining responsible stakeholders in the Trump Admin. However, even Elbridge Colby, who more accurately represents the America First foreign policy agenda, has not called for completely abandoning allies. Colby is more willing to be antagonistic with Asian allies and more focused on the China threat but doesn’t call for withdrawal.
The Marathon Initiative: Sharing the Load: Developing Better Strategies for Burden Sharing:
[Colby recommends] aligning U.S. “asks” of its allies and partners with their conception of their interests. Instead of trying to fully align its perception of its interests with those of its allies, the United States should seek to work with the grain of their existing interests, focusing them more on tasks that they are, on realist grounds, more likely to be motivated to address anyway. Based on this framework, the study laid out a categorization for how to think about the roles of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe.
Ultimately, Trump will do what he wants. Asian leaders should take the Abe Shinzo approach and strive to build a personal relationship with Trump. This won’t solve issues that will arise between Washington and Asian capitals, but having a strong personal relationship with Trump might make it easier for him to delink areas of confrontation from opportunities for cooperation. Additionally, by and large, Congressional Republicans support a more traditional and collaborative approach to Asian allies. Senator Roger Wicker recently released a defense budgeting report that I suspect many Asian partners would welcome. Building a healthy relationship with Congress would be critical to mitigating Trump’s most concerning impulses.
Worth Your Time:
Australia:
South Korea:
Defense News: South Korea Orders First Batch of KF-21 Fighters
Nikkei Asia: U.S. Aircraft Carrier Arrives in South Korea for Military Drills
The Korea Herald: S. Korea, US Hold New Round of Talks on Defense Cost Sharing
Japan:
Philippines:
Taiwan:
Foreign Policy: The Taiwan Aid Bill Won’t Fix the Arms Backlog
Breaking Defense: US Needs to Invest in Cheaper Long-Range Drones for Taiwan Scenario
India: